Denver Law Review
Volume 7

Issue 8

Article 4

January 1930

Is the Recording of a Deed Evidence of Delivery?
Samuel H. Sterling

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.du.edu/dlr

Recommended Citation
Samuel H. Sterling, Is the Recording of a Deed Evidence of Delivery?, 7 Dicta 8 (1930).

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Denver Law Review at Digital Commons @ DU. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Denver Law Review by an authorized editor of Digital Commons @ DU. For more
information, please contact jennifer.cox@du.edu,dig-commons@du.edu.

IS THE RECORDING OF A DEED
EVIDENCE OF DELIVERY?
By Samuel H. Sterling of the Denver Bar
OME uncertainty exists in the minds of attorneys examining titles to real property in regard to the effect of
a deed recorded long after execution, arising from the
decision of Mr. Justice Campbell in Larison vs. Taylor, 83
Colo. 430, and the construction placed upon this decision by
Mr. Albert J. Gould in his article in the September "Dicta".
It is a frequent experience to encounter a transfer of
property where a year or more has elapsed between the execution of a deed and its recording. In fact, title examiners
not uncommonly find that in the majority of transfers of
property there has been a lapse between the execution of the
deed and its recordation. Whether the "long time" rule
enunciated by Mr. Justice Campbell is a proper cause of
anxiety to the examiner of ordinary and reasonable prudence,
and whether a month, a year, or three years is a "long time"
are our present problems.
To begin with, in examining the case of Larison v. Taylor,
it is pertinent to notice that this case was decided in the
Supreme Court, March 19, 1928, and a rehearing denied on
April 9, 1928. The 1927 State Legislature, in Senate Bill,
Number 274, passed "An act concerning real property and
to render titles to real property and to interests and estates
therein, more safe, secure and marketable", which was approved with an 'Emergency Clause' attached March 28, 1927.
This act was, therefore, in effect when the case of Larison v.
Taylor reached the Supreme Court. Although this legislative Act was passed apparently to apply to all cases which
involved titles to real estate, this Act was neither pleaded in
the County Court, where the Larison Case was tried, nor
mentioned in the decisions of the County or Supreme Courts.
In view of the fact that Chapter 150, of the 1927 Session Laws
was not considered in handing down the decision on this case,
we may assume either that the Act was considered inapplicable
to the case, or that it was overlooked.
The applicability of the Act to the Larison Case cannot
be doubted, for the heading proclaims that the Act is to 'ren-

DICTA

der titles to real property-more safe, secure and marketable',
and then provides in Section 1, seventh paragraph:
"If such instrument be acknowledged in the manner herein provided
and recorded in the office of the proper county clerk and recorder, it shall
also be prima fade evidence of due delivery."

This paragraph is merely an enunciation of the rule adjudicated in a majority of jurisdictions, as stated in 8 R.C.L.
1005:
"Delivery may be inferred from the fact of acknowledgment.

Like-

wise, the fact that a deed is on record is prima fade evidence of delivery and
acceptance, or, as otherwise stated, warrants a presumption of delivery and
acceptance, so that whoever makes assertion to the contrary has the burden
of proving it. Moreover, since recording takes the place of the solemn ceremonies accompanying livery of seizin at common law, it has been called evidence of delivery of the most cogent character, requiring the countervailing

proof to be clear and persuasive."

The statement that "whoever makes assertion to the contrary
(that there was no delivery of the recorded deed) has the
burden of proving it" may be in direct conflict with the rule
laid down by Mr. Justice Campbell that "Where delivery of
a deed is placed in issue, the burden of proof rests upon the
party asserting delivery." However, we are not considering
which party has the burden of proof, for even under the rule
of Larison v. Taylor an equitable result is reached, because
of the particular facts involved. In any case, however, involving title to property, even though the one seeking to establish a delivery has the burden of proof, he is still able t9
take advantage of the legislative sanction of a prima facie evidence of delivery in his favor, where there has been a deed
recorded, and he is only bound to go forward and sustain his
burden of proof in those cases where the opponent has brought
in evidence to rebut his prima facie evidence. We mention
this because of the statement of Mr. Justice Campbell that the
County Court in hearing the Larison Case mistakenly placed
the burden of proof on the wrong party, and we wish to show
merely that, even though the proponent of the deed has the
burden of proof, he still has the prima facie evidence of delivery to support his case where there has been a recording.
Since our contention is that recording is a prima facie
delivery, it would be well to note the devolution of our present
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system of acknowledgment and recording. The ceremony of
acknowledging and recording a deed is wholly of statutory
origin, it being unknown at common law. The oldest form
of livery of seisin was superseded by the refinement of a writing executed in the presence of witnesses, but this in turn, has
been superseded by a form of acknowledgment contained in
Section 1, Session Laws of 1927, containing the legislative
fiat that
"any instrument relating-to title to real property acknowledged substantially" in the given form shall "-be prima facie evidence: First: That the
person named therein as acknowledging the instrument, appeared in person
before the official taking the acknowledgment, and was personally known to
such official to be the person whose name was subscribed to the instrument
and that such person acknowledged that he signed the instrument as his
own free and voluntary act for the uses and purposes therein set forth."

"Prima facie evidence" is used, then, in the Real Property
Act of 1927 in two places-first, the proper acknowledgment
"is prima facie evidence of the proper execution thereof" and
secondly, proper acknowledging and recording is "prima facie
evidence of due delivery." The term "prima facie evidence"
has been defined as meaning evidence "which suffices for the
proof of a particular fact until contradicted and overcome by
other evidence." Dodson v. Watson, 110 Tex. 355, 220 S.W.
771. Accordingly, the effect of the statute is not to shift the
burden of proof as to delivery, but merely requires the party
asserting that there has been no acknowledgment or delivery
to bring in evidence to rebut the prima facie evidence of
recording.
Although in Larison v. Taylor the Court merely repeated
the bald statement of the rule contained in 18 C. J. 413 as to
burden of proof, without allowing the defendants the benefit
of their prima facie evidence as provided by the legislature,
yet the facts of that case were so strongly in favor of the plaintiff as to overcome the prima facie evidence of the defendant's
recording, and no evidence was brought in by the defendant
to uphold his case. However, in other cases the opponent
might not present such a preponderance of evidence.
Now as to the statement that "There is no presumption
of the delivery of a deed where it is not recorded until long
after its date" citing 18 C.J. 420 as authority, there is evidently

DICTA

some error as to authorities, for Mr. Justice Campbell quotes
this passage as authority with the declaration that there are a
"large number of cases" following this rule. From an examination of the text it appears that there are only two cases in
support of this principle, one of them being Cussack v.
Tweedy, 126 N.Y. 81, 26 N.E. 1033, involving an imperfect
and incomplete deed which was recorded without the signature of some of the grantors. This case arose upon the recording of the deed after a lapse of 50 years between the supposed
execution and recording. In the other cited case, BouvierLager Coal Land Co. v. Sypher, 186 Fed. 644, the deed in
question was not presented for record until 9 years after its
date, and title was not asserted by the persons claiming under
the grantee for nearly 50 years after its date of execution, or
40 years after its recording. All the parties to the supposed
deed had died, and also the officer before whom 'it was purported to have been acknowledged, and furthermore, the deed
was acknowledged by an unknown person, who was not shown
to have had any connection with the grantee.
We notice one characteristic common to both of these
cases, that it was not the time which had elapsed between the
execution of the deeds and their recording which was objectionable, but the judgments were based in both cases on other
matters. In the Cussack case, the objectionable feature was
that the deed under which the plaintiffs claimed title was
lacking the signatures of several grantors, and so, irrespective
of the lapse of 50 years before recording, they could not claim
title to the land. In the Bouvier case the fault lay in an
acknowledgment by a person other than the grantee. When
the acknowledgment failed, no presumption of delivery
existed, and, furthermore, the failure of the persons claiming
under the deed to assert their rights for a period of 40 years
influenced the court in its conclusion. It was evidence dehors
the deed which really prevented recovery of the land. In both
cases it is apparent that it was not the mere delay in recording
which created a presumption of non-delivery.
Returning to the Larison Case, we now find that the principle enunciated by Coipus Juris, that there is "no presumption of delivery where a long time has elapsed" is entirely inapplicable to the Larison Case. In the first place, the prin-
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ciple based on the two cases in Corpus Juris does not remotely
apply to nor touch upon the Larison Case. A lapse of 40 or
50 years may be conceded to be a "long time", but in view of
the Colorado statute as to prima facie evidence, 6 years cannot
be such a "long time" as to come under the principle of the
other two cases.
In the Larison case, even though there had been a recording of the deed the day after it was executed, there can be no
doubt the Supreme Court would have arrived at the same
conclusion. It is a maxim of law that fraud vitiates all things,
and recorded deeds are no exception to the rule. The plaintiff,
Larison, never had the slightest intention of delivering the
deed until she died, and this having been proved and relied
upon as a ground for cancelling and discharging a warranty
deed, especially one obtained through fraud, would be a good
reason for the decision in the Larison Case whether the deed
was recorded a day after its execution or six years later, as
was actually the fact. This being true, the statement that
"There is no presumption of the delivery of a deed where it
is not recorded until long after its date" is mere dicta, or at
the most, a conclusion founded upon cumulative evidence
which was not necessary for the final decision of the Larison
Case. Not only was it unnecessary, but it was also inapplicable
to the case, for the authorities cited in its support, if taken
case by case and compared, are not comparable in any of their
facts. Therefore this principle cannot stand as law, and its
further recognition can only cause a vicious doctrine to become law, and this in contravention to the express provisions
of our statutes, which seem to have been overlooked or disregarded.
Just how misleading this 'long time' doctrine may be, is
apparent from the article written by Albert Gould, Jr. in the
September, 1929, issue of 'Dicta', accepting the logical import of Mr. Justice Campbell's statement. Mr. Gould, upon
the authority of this statement, maintained that an escrow
agreement, or any deed, may be questioned where there has
been a long delay in recordation. As a practical matter, his
suggestions regarding the drawing up of escrow agreements
in such a manner as to show the reasons for the lapse of time
between the execution of a deed and its recordation, are ex-
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cellent. However, this can only serve as a possible means of
avoiding trouble in the future, and on the other hand, the
lack of a clause in a deed explaining the delay does not, and
should not, render that instrument any more questionable, as
to delivery, under Mr. Justice Campbell's decision in the
Larison v. Taylor case than it has in the past.
Since the logical import of the 'long time' doctrine should
have no effect, or at the most, should be confined to cases involving fraud and deceit, or other defects in the deed besides
delayed recordation, this means that the general and established rules are to have full force and effect, especially in view
of Section 44, of the Real Property Act of '27, which states
"It is hereby declared to be the policy in this state that this act and
all other acts and laws concerning or affecting title to real property and every
interest therein and all recorded instruments-shall be liberally construed and
with the end in view of rendering such titles absolute and free from technical
defects, and so that subsequent purchasers and incumbrances-may rely on
the record title, and so that the record title of -the party in possession shall be
sustained and not be defeated by technical or strict constructions."

With the purpose and intent of the Legislature so precise-

ly and exactly expressed, and the 'long time' rule shown to be
generally inapplicable, it is only logical that the general rule,
as expressed in the note to 54 L.R.A. 884 be given effect:
"The general rule, undoubtedly, is that a presumption of delivery
arises from the fact that a deed has been recorded, which presumption arises
from the bare fact of recording. Especially where the deed is reorded by
the grantor."

Of course, where the deed is recorded by the grantee, either
unauthorizedly or fraudulently, lack of delivery can always
be pleaded by the grantor.
To summarize, Mr. Justice Campbell's statement of the
law that "There is no presumption of the delivery of a deed
where it is not recorded until long after its date" should not
control in ordinary cases, where there is a lapse of time between the execution of a deed and the recording thereof, for
the foregoing reasons:
1. This statement of the rule taken from Corpus Juris is derived
from two cases which differ from the Larison Case so fundamentally that
the cases are in no way similar to it. Therefore, any rule derived from these
cases cannot serve as sound authority for the rule announced in the Larison
Case, nor control in determining titles to real property.
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2. This rule is plainly dictum, or at the most is merely cumulative
reason for deciding the case as it was eventually decided. The plaintiff in
the Larison Case proved non-delivery so conclusively that she could have
obtained a judgment regardless of any other proof, and it is this evidence of
non-delivery that decided the case. The 'long time' doctrine did not enter
into the final decision of the case, and since the case was decided on principles
extraneous to this, the 'long time' doctrine is dictum, and as such is not controlling in any contingency where there has been a lapse of time between
the execution and recording of the deed.
3. The legislature has expressed in a clear and concise manner the
general principle that acknowledging and recording of a deed shall be prima
facie evidence of its delivery.
4. Since the 'long time' rule is ineffective as to its applicability to
deeds, the general rule, which is the rule announced by our legislature, governs, and the acknowledging and recording of a deed are prima facie evidence
of its delivery.

IN RE SUPREME COURT LIBRARY
The following letter addressed to the Editor has been
received and seems to embody a suggestion worth thinking
about. Dicta invites comment on the matter.
The Supreme Court Library is the one place in Colorado
where all the law on a given question can be found; it not
only has the most books, but they are available when wanted,
which is not always true of many of the Denver building
libraries.
In the past I have, by permission, spent some evenings
working there, and the ease with which work can be done at
night in a well-equipped room away from street noises, in a
library from which no book has been taken far away to rest
on another lawyer's desk, where if a book is out it can always
be found in some other series of reports, and where there is
a late text on almost every subject, has made me wonder why
some arrangement is not made for the use of this library in
the evenings.
It seems to me that it would be worth while for the
Denver Bar Association to see if some arrangement could be
worked out with the Supreme Court for the use of the library
at night under proper supervision paid for by the court or by
the bar association.
Yours very truly,
BENTLEY M. MCMULLIN.

